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Abstract  
This paper examines the effect of ethnic diversity on the efficiency of public spending in a set 
of developing countries. For this purpose, we use Data Envelopment Analysis to assess the 
efficiency of public spending in the sectors of health, education and infrastructure in 77 
developing countries over the period 1996-2012. Further, we investigate the effect of ethnic 
diversity on the cross country variation in efficiency. Two main findings emerge. First, barely 
12% of the sample of countries under study makes an efficient use of public expenditure. 
Second, no matters the level of aggregation, ethnic polarization is positively associated with 
higher efficiency. In contrast, ethnic fractionalization does have a negative or at the best no 
effect on efficiency, especially at the finest level of disaggregation. 
 
Key words: Ethnic diversity, Public spending efficiency, Developing countries 
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1. Introduction 
An extensive literature exists on the relationship between ethnic diversity and the provision of 
public goods. An important strand of this literature underlines the cost associated with ethnic 
heterogeneity. Conflict of preferences and lack of coordination may lead to reduced provision 
of public goods (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005; Desmet et al, 
2012). In contrast, several other studies suggest that ethnic diversity brings about various 
abilities, experiences, flexibility and know-how that may lead to higher innovation and 
productivity (McLeod et al, 1996; Alesina et al, 1999; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Egel, 
2013). This study adds further to this later literature by investigating the effect of ethnic 
diversity on the efficiency of public spending.  
The literature highlights three important mechanisms that shape the relationship between 
ethnic diversity and the provision of public goods. The first mechanism points out the 
diversity in preferences between different ethnic groups. In fact individuals may have a taste 
for homogeneity and attribute negative utility to the well-being of members of other groups 
(Alesina et al, 1999). Therefore, they may be less willing to contribute for the provision of 
public goods since this will benefit other groups. An alternative mechanism hinges on the idea 
that coordination may be higher in homogeneous group compared to ethnic heterogeneous 
ones (Miguel and Gugerty, 2005). In ethnically diverse societies, people may be less likely to 
trust their fellow citizens and less likely to coordinate in order to fund the public good. 
Finally, since people differ in their cognitive and productive skills that are complement in the 
production function, ethnic heterogeneity may lead to higher productivity. Although valuable, 
few studies have tested this latter mechanism at the macro level. This paper builds on the 
literature of performance measurement to assess the efficiency of public spending and how it 
relates with ethnic diversity in developing countries.  
Our contribution is threefold. First, we use Data Envelopment Analysis to assess the 
efficiency of public spending in the sectors of health, education and infrastructure in a set of 
developing countries over the period 1996-2012. The outputs used are respectively infant 
mortality, years of education and the percentage of paved roads. Second, we relate our 
measure of efficiency to measures of ethnic diversity. Following Desmet et al (2012), we use 
both ethno linguistic fractionalization and ethno linguistic polarization at different degree of 
aggregation. Finally, we take into account the potential endogeneity of ethnic diversity by 
using historical and geographic variables as exclusion restrictions in a recursive framework
1
.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the existing literature. In Section 3, 
we present the data on efficiency and ethnic diversity. Section 4 is about econometric model. 
In Section 5, we present the results. The last section concludes.  
2. Literature Review 
Following the seminal paper of Easterly and Levine (1997), the effect of ethnic diversity on 
economic performance has been extensively studied.  Racial and ethnic cleavage is often 
associated with ethnic conflict, low provision of public goods, low school attainment and bad 
infrastructure quality among other (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina et al, 2003; Garcia-
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005a,b; Desmet et al, 2012). The cost of diversity stems from 
the conflict of preferences because individuals may attribute positive utility to the well-being 
                                                 
1
 Note that the IV approach and the recursive bivariate models are two distinct econometric approaches to tackle 
the endogeneity problem.  Thus, our model can be viewed as a simple recursive bivariate model where we add 
more information about the potential predictors of ethnic diversity.  
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of members of their own group and negative utility to that of members of other groups 
(Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005). The diversity doesn‟t only affect preferences, but also the 
strategies of individuals. In this line, the literature suggests that when there are market 
imperfections, individuals prefer to transact with members of their own group since they are 
more trustworthy (Greif, 1993; La Ferrara, 2003a). This leads to less trade and poor economic 
performance. Although this literature is widespread, some papers highlight the potential 
benefits of ethnic diversity (Huntington, 1998; Rauch, 2001; Rauch and Casella, 2003; 
Alesina and La ferrara, 2005; Egel, 2013). As suggested by Alesina and La ferrara (2005), 
diverse ethnic mix bring about variety in abilities, experiences and cultures that may lead to 
innovation and more productivity. Likewise, Page (2014) shows that people with diverse 
productive and cognitive abilities can find optimal solutions to difficult problems. Therefore, 
diverse group of people with low abilities can outperform a more homogenous group with 
high abilities. Similar finding is provided by Nathan (2014). In a recent experimental study, 
Chakravarti and Fonseca (2014) show that while high fragmentation leads to lower 
contribution to public goods by members of the majority group, homogenous groups performs 
as well as fragmented groups.  
In the empirical literature, ethnic diversity has been associated with a wide range of outcomes 
including political instability, investment, fiscal policy, trade openness, market distortion and 
growth.  
Early evidence provided by Easterly and Levine (1997) suggests that more ethnically 
fragmented countries grow less. They argue, in the specific case of Africa that ethnic diversity 
is associated with social and political divisions that make impossible the adoption of sound 
policies. This result has been challenged by Arcand et al (2000) who pointed out that the few 
number of observations for Africa may cast a doubt on this relationship. Moreover, they 
argued that the ethno linguistic measure used is not appropriate as it is largely dependent on 
ethnic group. However, a later paper of Alesina et al (2003) confirmed the previous results 
using both ethno linguistic and polarization data. Conversely, Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) 
showed that under reasonable condition on technology, ethnic fractionalization may have a 
positive effect on output at higher level of development. Likewise, Collier (2000), Easterly 
(2001) suggest that the negative effect of ethnic fractionalization may be mitigated in 
democratic regimes.  
Ethnic diversity has also been associated with political instability and violence. In this line, 
Collier (2001) found that ethnic divided societies are more prone to ethnic violence and 
political instability. Similarly, Garcia-Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a,b) show that 
ethnic polarization is a significant predictor of civil war. They argue that the lack of 
correlation between ethnic diversity and conflict found in the previous literature is due to the 
use of an index of fractionalization rather than an index of polarization. Finally, Desmet et al 
(2012), using linguistic tree found that deep ethnic cleavage is a powerful predictor of the 
onset of civil conflict.  
Several papers have pointed out the incertitude generated by political instability as one of the 
main explanation of the low level of investment observed in ethnic diverse societies (Annett, 
2001; Garcia-Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005a). This evidence confirms the previous 
finding of Easterly and Levine (1997). They have shown that ethnically diverse societies may 
suffer from rent-seeking behavior, implying a non-productive use of inputs and low 
investment.  
The existing empirical literature suggests that ethnic diversity matters for fiscal policy 
(Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina et al, 1999; Alesina et La Ferrara, 2005; Stichnoth and 
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Van der Straeten, 2013
2
). In his seminal paper Easterly and Levine (1997) stressed that public 
goods provision in ethnic diverse societies may favor only the leading ethnic group. A 
subsequent work of Alesina et al (1999), using US data showed that productive public goods 
(education, roads, libraries) are inversely related to city‟s ethnic fragmentation. Therefore, the 
supply of public goods should be lower in ethnically divided countries. In contrast, Annett 
(2001) find that ethnic fractionalization is positively related to government consumption. The 
main explanation of this finding is that the fearing of political instability leads the government 
which risks being overthrown to use government expenditures to appease the competing 
groups and mitigate the possibility of ethnic conflict. Furthermore, ethnic fractionalization 
seems to be negatively correlated with infrastructure quality, literacy, school attainment while 
it is positively correlated with infant mortality (Alesina et al, 2003; Kuijs, 2000). In an early 
study, Mueller and Murrell (1986), using a sample of OECD countries, show that public 
spending is negatively associated with ethnic diversity. Alesina et al (2001), using US data 
over the period 1960-1998 do not find a significant effect of ethnic diversity on social 
spending. However, they find a significant negative relationship between racial 
fractionalization and social spending. The above studies have been criticized on several 
aspects. One of those aspects is related to the comparison of social spending across countries. 
In this line, Durlauf (2001) points to the fact that the structure of social spending may vary 
across countries. Therefore cross country analysis may be misleading. Another issue is related 
to the measurement of ethnic diversity. Three main concerns are raised in the literature. First, 
data used in most of the empirical studies date back to 1960s and assume implicitly that ethnic 
diversity doesn‟t change or change slowly (Chandra, 2001; Posner, 2002). Second, as pointed 
out by Laitin and Posner (2001), ethnic identity has more than one dimension and could not 
be restricted to ethno-linguistic groups. Third, some authors point out the relevance of the 
measure used. For instance, Collier (2001) calls to a clear distinction between ethnic 
fragmentation and ethnic dominance while Arcand et al (2000) advise to use polarization 
index rather than fractionalization index.   Recent studies analyze the effect of ethnic diversity 
at the sub national level. Hopkins (2009) suggests that it is not ethnic diversity per se that lead 
to the reduction of the provision of public goods, but rather sudden changes in ethnic 
composition of the population. This contrasts with a previous finding according to which the 
effect of ethnic diversity is positive at the county level and negative at the state level (Cutler 
et al, 1993).  
In order to shed the light on the force behind the aggregated results, several studies have been 
undertaken at the micro level, focusing on individual behavior. As reported by Stichnoth and 
Van der Straeten (2013), the mechanism through which ethnic diversity affect social spending 
is individual‟s preferences. In fact, ethnic diversity may make people less supportive of 
redistributive policies, implying a decrease of public spending. This operates mainly through 
two main channels: social capital and attitude towards the welfare states (Stichnoth and Van 
der Straeten, 2013). Several studies have shown that the level of social capital is lower in 
more heterogeneous communities (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; Alesina and La Ferrara, 
2002; Costa and Kahn, 2003). In most recent studies, Hungerman (2008, 2009) use the 
participation to charity activities as a measure of social capital and find that homogeneous 
communities tend to be less active compared to the heterogeneous ones. Hungerman (2009) 
shows that the crowding-out of charitable activities by government spending is only 
significant in ethnically homogeneous communities. Besides, several papers (Luttmer, 2001; 
Lind, 2007; Senik et al, 2009) have shown that people tend to be less supportive of welfare 
                                                 
2
 Stichnoth and Van der Straeten, 2013 provide an extensive survey on the relationship between ethnic diversity 
and public spending.  
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spending in ethnically diverse societies. In addition, Miguel and Gugerty(2005) examine the 
relationship between ethnic diversity and the provision of local public goods in Kenya. Their 
findings suggest that ethnic diversity is associated with lower primary school funding and 
worse school facilities, and poor water well maintenance. In contrast, Egel (2013) on a sample 
of 4000 Yemeni local tribes find that areas with greater tribal heterogeneity receive larger 
allocation of publicly provided teachers and classrooms. They interpret this finding as 
evidence of tribes' roles in influencing both political patronage from the state and targeted 
development transfers from development donors.  
To summarize, the relationship between ethnic diversity and the provision of public good 
remains controversial. Moreover, studies analyzing the potential benefits of ethnic diversity 
on productivity are scarce, especially at the macro level.  
3. Methodology and data measurement 
This section describes the methodology and the main data used in this paper.  
3. 1. Measuring the efficiency of public spending 
Since the pioneer paper of Farrel (1957), various methods have been proposed to assess the 
efficiency
3
 of a productive unit. The most used can be classified into parametric and non-
parametric approaches (Herrera and Pang, 2005). The parametric approach uses econometric 
tools and imposes specific assumptions, both for the functional form of the relationship 
between the input and the output, and for the inefficiency term calculated as the deviation of 
the observed values from the frontier. In contrast, the non-parametric approach uses linear 
programming techniques to compute an unobserved efficiency frontier for each productive 
unit. Alongside with this bourgeoning literature, Wagstaff and Wang (2011) proposed a 
hybrid method which make use of both underlined approaches.  
In this paper, we use a non-parametric method, specifically the Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) to assess the efficiency of public spending.  
 We measure the input oriented technical efficiency of three types of public spending: 
education, health and infrastructure, on the sample of 77 countries over the period 1996-2012. 
This choice is only dictated by data availability and the necessity to keep a relative stable 
sample since the DEA method is very sensitive to changes in the sample size. We use a single 
input-single output approach. The input oriented analysis is chosen because unlike output, 
input choice is under the control of policy makers. As inputs, the respective public spending 
on health, education and infrastructure are used. It is worth mentioning that public spending 
are orthogonalized prior use in the dynamic programing. Specifically, public spending are 
purged from the potential effect of GDP since richer countries may have higher public 
spending. Data on public spending are drawn the World Bank-World Development Indicator 
(2012). We use gross fixed capital formation as a proxy of spending on infrastructure. The 
outputs used are respectively infant mortality, years of education and the percentage of paved 
roads. Years of education are taken from the Barro and Lee (2014) database on education 
attainment while infant mortality and the percentage of paved road are from the World 
Development Indicators (2012). The choice of infant mortality is justified by the fact it is one 
                                                 
3
 It is worth noting that we focus mainly on the technical efficiency in this paper. This is when a productive 
agent use more inputs than technically required to obtain a given level of output. The second type of efficiency 
(Allocative) is more difficult to assess since it requires comparable input prices across countries (Herrera and 
Pang, 2005).  
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of the key target in the health sector, according to the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). The number of years of education is chosen since it is the result or an outcome of all 
the other indicators such as school enrolment rate and completion rate. Finally, since we want 
to assess the quality of infrastructure, we use the number of paved roads in percentage of the 
total road network.  
Figure 1 displays the distribution of efficiency score in the health sector across regions. The 
figure suggests that the most efficient region is Sub-Saharan Africa while the least efficient 
one is Latin America and Caribbean. The good performance of Africa may find an 
explanation in recent efforts made by government, together with donors in order to improve 
the quality of the management of public expenditures in the health sector. This includes 
matching public services with citizens „preferences, ensuring equity and efficiency in service 
provision, and finally more accountability (World Bank, 2005).  
Figure 1: Cross-region distribution of efficiency of public spending on health  
 
Source: Author‟s calculation based on data from WDI(2012), World Bank  
Figure 2 presents the distribution of the efficiency scores in the education sector. According to 
this figure, the best performer is Europe and Central Asia while the poor performer is South 
Asia. Finally, Figure 3 portrays the distribution of efficiency scores in the sector of 
infrastructure. The figure illustrates that the efficiency of public spending in infrastructure is 
higher in Europe and Central Asia, while it is lower in East Asia and Pacific.  
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Figure 2: Cross-region distribution of efficiency of public spending on education 
  
Source: Author‟s calculation based on data from WDI(2012), World Bank  
Figure 3: Cross-region distribution of efficiency of public spending on infrastructure 
 
Source: Author‟s calculation based on data from WDI(2012), World Bank  
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Figures 4, 5 & 6 provide a more detailed view as they look at the specific situation of country. 
Figure 4 shows the DEA estimation of the efficiency frontier for health spending. Countries 
with higher health expenditure per capita seem to be less efficient. In other word they spend 
more to reach the same level of output (infant mortality) as companion countries. This is the 
case for Costa Rica and Argentina. The two best performers in the sector are Malaysia and 
Sierra Leone. 
4
 
Figure 4: Correlation of public expenditure on health and infant mortality 
 
In the sector of education, Figure 5 illustrates the fact that the most inefficient countries are 
African countries, especially Lesotho and Namibia. The most efficient are Kazakhstan and 
Turkey. Finally in the infrastructure sector (Figure 6), five countries are top performers, 
namely Jordan, Mexico, South Africa, Turkey and Ukraine.   
  
                                                 
4
 These countries are in red in the figures.  
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Figure 5: Correlation of public expenditure on education and years of education 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Correlation of public expenditure on infrastructure and % of paved roads 
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2. Measuring ethno linguistic diversity 
Data on ethno linguistic diversity are drawn from Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín and Wacziarg (2012). 
This database is the most comprehensive and the most recent one
5
. These authors use the 
language tree approach to generate the measure of linguistic diversity at different level of 
aggregation. The language tree describes the linguistic differentiation that occurred from the 
major language family.  
Two measures are considered: the polarization measure and the fractionalization measure. 
The index of ethno linguistic fractionalization is computed as the probability that two 
randomly picked individual belong to different groups. The measure is maximized when each 
individual belongs to a different group (Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín and Wacziarg, 2012). The 
polarization index measures to what extent the distribution of ethnic groups is bipolar 
(Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005). These measures are computed for the 15 levels of 
aggregation available in the linguistic classification in 15
th
 edition of Ethnologue (Desmet, 
Ortuño-Ortín and Wacziarg, 2012).  
In this paper our measure of ethnic diversity is the index of ethno linguistic fractionalization. 
This choice is based on the fact that this measure is extensively used in the literature (see 
Alesina et al, 1999; Alesina et al, 2003; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005). Moreover, as shown 
by Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín and Wacziarg (2012), what matters most is the level of aggregation 
and not whether one measures diversity using languages, ethnicities or religions
6
.  
Figure 7 illustrates the distribution of ethnic diversity across regions. The figure shows that at 
the highest level of aggregation, the East Asia and Pacific region seems to be the more ethnic 
diverse one. However, at the highest level of disaggregation, Sub-Saharan Africa is the most 
diverse region. It is worth mentioning that the comparison is more relevant as the level of 
disaggregation increases. In fact the probability that two peoples chosen randomly belong to 
different groups increases with the level of disaggregation.  
  
                                                 
5
 Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín and Wacziarg (2012) provides an extensive discussion concerning the correlation 
between this measure of ethnic diversity and the ones provided in the literature including Easterly and Levine 
(1997), Alesina et al (2003).  
6
 However, for the sake of comparison, we also provide results using the polarization index.  
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Figure 7: Distribution of ethnic diversity across regions 
 
Source: Author‟s calculation based on Desmet et al (2012) 
3. Econometric model 
The relationship between ethnic diversity and the efficiency of public spending is examined 
using a censored (Tobit) regression because the input efficiency score is a continuous variable 
distributed over a 0-1 interval. Our main empirical specification is as follows: 
iiii XEthnicef  
'*                                                                                             (1) 
*
ief is the latent variable of our outcome measure (efficiency of education spending, efficiency 
of spending on infrastructure, efficiency of health spending) for country i ; Ethnic is the 
measure of ethnic diversity (alternatively ethnic fractionalization and ethnic polarization), and 
X is a vector of control variables which include the logarithm of urban population in 
percentage of total population, the logarithm of GDP per capita, tax revenues in percentage of 
GDP, the logarithm of total percentage of educated people (primary and secondary 
education), the initial level of inequality, geographic factors (latitude and longitude), initial 
level of corruption, governance effectiveness and democracy index. In addition, we control 
for heterogeneity across region by including regional fixed effects. We expect a positive sign 
on the variable of urban population since the clustering of agent in urban area compared to 
rural ones make cheaper the provision of public goods (Herrera and Pang, 2005). The 
logarithm of GDP per capita controls for the income effect. In fact richer countries may be 
less efficient given the higher level of wage in these countries. But they are also likely to be 
well organized and therefore more efficient. Education is include into the model because high 
skilled people are more able to capitalize new efficient organization practices and are more 
likely to put strong emphasis on social expenditure (Kuijs, 2000). Tax revenues control for the 
fact that public spending is constrained by the availability of public resources (Kuijs, 2000). 
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Higher income is expected to negatively impact efficiency while better quality of institution 
raises the level of technic efficiency.  
The link between the latent variable and the actual observed variable is such that: 
    (   )  {
              
            
           
                                                                                  (2) 
Where              are the censoring thresholds. Although the literature argues that ethnic 
diversity is a highly time persistent variable that is likely to be largely historical determined 
well before the dependent, the possibility of reverse causality cannot be totally ruled out 
(Alesina et al, 2003; Desmet et al, 2012). In order to address this issue, we propose a two 
stage modelling approach where in the first stage, ethnic diversity is regressed on a set of 
historical potential determinants and controls. The model looks as follows: 
11  Ethnic                                                                                                                       (3) 
22
*)(   efgef                                                                                                              (4) 
Where  '1
'
1 XX      and 
'
2 X . Note that ),( 21    ),0(  ,  [
  
  
],   is the 
degree of correlation between the error terms of equation (3) & (4), and measure the 
endogeneity of ethnic diversity in the reduced form equation (1). The main advantage of this 
approach is that it does assume neither exogeneity nor the endogeneity of ethnic diversity. 
These assumptions are explicitly tested in the model. Specifically, in specifications, a 
significant arthro suggests that ethnic diversity were actually not exogenous.  
  
  is a set of exclusion restrictions including terrain ruggedness index and distance in 
kilometers to slave markets respectively for Atlantic trade, Indian trade and Saharan trade.  
While the exogeneity of ethnic diversity has often been taken as granted in the literature, 
recent papers have shown that it might rather been driven by historical and geographical 
factors (Michalopoulos, 2012;  Alesina et al, 2011; Ahlerup and Olsson, 2012).  Ahlerup and 
Olsson (2012) show that ethnic diversity is higher in countries with a longer uninterrupted 
duration of human settlement, which lie closer to equator and have a natural fragmented 
geography. A potential explanation of this correlates is that the ethnic fragmentation process 
takes time and will therefore have come further in countries with a longer history of human 
settlement. Moreover, fragmented geography reduces people mobility and allows ethnic 
identity to form over time. It is also worth mentioning that a fragmented geography could also 
help keeping more homogenous ethnic groups since less interaction implies that peoples for 
very different origins are less likely to be pooled in the same area. This later argument 
explains why artificial states measures are positively correlated with ethnic diversity (Alesina 
et al, 2011). In addition, Michalopoulos (2012) models ethnic diversity as a consequence of 
geographic characteristics of countries and regions. His findings suggest that geographic 
variability captured by variability in land quality and elevation, is a fundamental determinant 
of contemporary linguistic diversity. He argues that differences in land endowments gave rise 
to location-specific human capital, leading to the formation of localized ethnicities. We take 
advantage of this rich literature by using historical and geographical facts as potential 
exogenous sources of ethnic diversity in a set of developing countries. Our first exclusion 
restriction (terrain ruggedness) captures small scale terrain irregularities and is drawn from 
Nunn and Puga (2012). Rugged terrains have both direct geographical effects and indirect 
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historical effects. The direct effect follows the argument of Michalopoulos (2012) and 
suggests that building costs and transportation costs associated with irregular terrain lead to 
higher ethnic diversity. Conversely, rugged terrain is expected to have lower ethnic diversity 
by having protected these areas from negative long term consequences of slave trade and 
colonization. Therefore, ethnicities living in rugged area are expected to have been less 
affected by slave trade and to have been able to keep a relative homogeneity. The three 
remaining exclusion restrictions (distance in kilometer to slave markets, respectively for 
Altantic, Indian and Saharan trade) reflect the fact that the most countries have been affected 
by historical events such as slave trade (ethnicities located close to slave markets), the more 
diverse they are today.  
4. Results 
This section reports the main results of the estimation of the effects of ethnic diversity on 
public spending efficiency in selected developing countries. In each table, we report the 
results for both fractionalization and polarization measures. We also report the estimates 
respectively at the highest level of aggregation (ELF1 & POL1) and at the finest level of 
disaggregation (ELF15 & POL15).  
Table 1 reports the estimates of the effect of ethnic diversity on the efficiency of public 
spending on health. The first two columns present the results for fractionalization measure 
while the last two other are about ethnic polarization. The first-step exclusion restrictions are 
presented at the bottom of the table, alongside with the arthrho which measure the level of the 
correlation between the errors terms of the two equations. The Chi2 test suggests that our 
exclusion restrictions are jointly statistically significant at the 1% level. However, as shown 
by the significance of arthrho, the issue of endogeneity is of concern in three out of four 
specifications.  
Turning to the results, at the highest level of aggregation, we find a positive and significant 
effect of fractionalization on the efficiency of public health spending. However, at the finest 
level of disaggregation, this effect is no longer significant. This result suggests that less ethno 
linguistic diversity favor more efficiency in the health sector. This result is somewhat in line 
with the literature showing that the provision of public goods is lower in ethnically diverse 
countries (Laporta et al, 1999; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005)
7
.  
When we make use of the polarization measure, we find that at both level of aggregation, the 
effect of ethnic diversity is positive and significant
8
. A possible explanation of this result is 
that in polarized societies, people are more likely to coordinate and define a type of turnover 
rule to benefit from public good. Besides, the results suggest that the efficiency is negatively 
associated to corruption and inequality while it is positively related with the size of urban 
population.  
The relationship between ethnic diversity and the efficiency of public spending in education 
depends upon the measure (Polarization or fractionalization) and the level of disaggregation.  
                                                 
7
 It is difficult to accurately compare our findings with those of the literature because to the best of our 
knowledge, the output is not measured the same way. Most of the paper use infrastructure quality index, school 
attainment, infant mortality as measure of public goods (see Desmet et al, 2012).  
8
 Note that the polarization is maximized when there are two groups of equal size.  
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Table 1:Effect of ethnic diversity on the efficiency of public spending on health 
  Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Ethnolinguistic Polarization 
Dependent Variable Efficiency score-DEA Efficiency score-DEA Efficiency score-DEA Efficiency score-DEA 
ELF1/POL1 0.340*** 
 
0.221*** 
 
 
(0.108) 
 
(0.0681) 
 ELF15/POL15 
 
0.0791 
 
0.226*** 
  
(0.110) 
 
(0.0841) 
Log(Urban Population % total) 0.132** 0.0686 0.137** 0.0790 
 
(0.0642) (0.0653) (0.0652) (0.0652) 
Log(GDP Per capita) -0.0426 -0.0119 -0.0525 -0.0273 
 
(0.0487) (0.0461) (0.0499) (0.0501) 
Tax revenue in % of GDP 0.00145 -0.000866 0.00267 -0.000872 
 
(0.00397) (0.00380) (0.00412) (0.00404) 
Log(total % educated people) -0.0517 -0.0837 -0.0482 -0.0782 
 
(0.0668) (0.0639) (0.0678) (0.0686) 
Initial Inequality-Gini index -0.340 -0.239 -0.366* -0.292 
 
(0.212) (0.206) (0.216) (0.219) 
Latitude 0.00180 0.000898 0.00190 0.00241 
 
(0.00244) (0.00234) (0.00247) (0.00258) 
Longitude -0.00182 -0.000803 -0.00209 0.000113 
 
(0.00169) (0.00162) (0.00173) (0.00174) 
Initial level of corruption-ICRG -0.0481* -0.0395 -0.0495* -0.0326 
 
(0.0252) (0.0242) (0.0256) (0.0263) 
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
First step-exclusion restrictions 
    Terrain ruggedness index, 100m 0.0646* -0.127 0.121* 0.0510* 
 
(0.0367) (0.0882) (0.0664) (0.0280) 
Distance from slave market-Atlantic -0.146*** -0.189** -0.249*** -0.183*** 
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(0.0413) (0.0874) (0.0754) (0.0352) 
Distance from slave market-indian -0.107*** -0.212*** -0.188*** -0.223*** 
 
(0.0353) (0.0756) (0.0639) (0.0348) 
Distance from slave market-Saharian -0.550** -0.853* -0.808* -0.656*** 
 
(0.264) (0.463) (0.479) (0.205) 
Constant 1.088*** 1.004*** 1.170*** 0.916** 
 
(0.390) (0.375) (0.398) (0.406) 
Observations 49 49 49 49 
Log Likelihood 58.44 47.80 44.61 62.98 
arthrho -1.187*** -0.0352 -1.196*** -1.768*** 
Prob>Chi2 (joint test of exclusion Restri) 0.0045 0.000 0.0130 0.000 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2 shows that the lower is the level of fractionalization, the higher is the efficiency in 
education. Specifically, one observes that at the finest level of disaggregation, ethnic 
fractionalization negatively affect the efficiency of education spending. In contrast, the effect 
of ethnic polarization on efficient is positive and significant no matter the level of 
aggregation. In addition, the Table 3 shows that the efficiency of education spending is 
positively correlated with the size of urban population, the level of governance, whereas it is 
negatively affected by corruption. Besides in all specifications, the null hypothesis of the 
correlation between the errors terms of two equations of the model is not rejected.  
Finally Table 3 reports the estimates of the effect of ethnic diversity on the efficiency of 
public spending in the sector of infrastructure. The effect of ethnic diversity is negative and 
significant at the lowest level of fractionalization. This effect loses its significance as the level 
of disaggregation increases. As regard to the polarization measure, the impact of ethnic 
diversity is only significant at the highest level of polarization. However, the magnitude of the 
effect is very small. Concerning the control variables, the efficiency of spending in 
infrastructure is positively correlated with the level of development and governance, while it 
is negatively associated with inequality.  
Overall, the empirical analysis point out to three main results. First, no matter the level of 
aggregation, ethnic polarization is positively associated with the efficiency of public 
spending. Second, the effect of ethnic fractionalization depends on the level of aggregation. 
Finally, the efficiency of public spending is mainly affected by the size of urban population 
and governance either measured by governance effectiveness or corruption.  
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Table 2: Effect of ethnic diversity on the efficiency of public spending on education 
  Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Ethnolinguistic Polarization 
Dependent Variable Efficiency score-DEA Efficiency score-DEA Efficiency score-DEA Efficiency score-DEA 
ELF1/POL1 0.382*** 
 
0.236*** 
 
 
(0.0929) 
 
(0.0527) 
 ELF15/POL15 
 
-0.174** 
 
0.253*** 
  
(0.0719) 
 
(0.0786) 
Log(Urban Population % total) 0.150*** 0.173*** 0.155*** 0.102** 
 
(0.0504) (0.0508) (0.0518) (0.0468) 
Log(GDP Per capita) -0.0574 -0.0205 -0.0687* -0.0235 
 
(0.0398) (0.0376) (0.0412) (0.0354) 
Tax revenue in % of GDP 0.00471* -0.00148 0.00522* 0.00111 
 
(0.00271) (0.00268) (0.00279) (0.00232) 
Log(total % educated people) 0.0675 0.00233 0.0722 0.0365 
 
(0.0556) (0.0518) (0.0569) (0.0494) 
Initial Inequality-Gini index -0.0818 0.113 -0.0926 -0.00742 
 
(0.149) (0.143) (0.153) (0.133) 
Latitude 0.00463*** 0.00224 0.00456*** 0.00453*** 
 
(0.00157) (0.00152) (0.00160) (0.00146) 
Longitude 0.00337*** 0.00438*** 0.00307** 0.00486*** 
 
(0.00127) (0.00119) (0.00131) (0.00111) 
Initial level of corruption-ICRG -0.0358* -0.0252 -0.0362* -0.00581 
 
(0.0205) (0.0195) (0.0210) (0.0191) 
Governance effectivenness 0.0752** 0.0547 0.0793** 0.0672** 
 
(0.0371) (0.0362) (0.0381) (0.0336) 
Democracy index-Polity4 0.00142 0.00299 0.00136 0.000669 
 
(0.00395) (0.00388) (0.00405) (0.00359) 
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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First step-exclusion restrictions 
    Terrain ruggedness index, 100m -0.0415 -0.0768 -0.0596 -0.0947** 
 
(0.0329) (0.0546) (0.0542) (0.0440) 
Distance from slave market-Atlantic -0.0808** -0.0591 -0.124** -0.128*** 
 
(0.0379) (0.0617) (0.0628) (0.0444) 
Distance from slave market-indian -0.0763** -0.0780 -0.123** -0.167*** 
 
(0.0320) (0.0660) (0.0540) (0.0500) 
Distance from slave market-Saharian 0.256 -0.830*** 0.538 -0.0459 
 
(0.216) (0.306) (0.355) (0.308) 
Constant -0.353 -0.558* -0.256 -0.710** 
 
(0.324) (0.308) (0.335) (0.294) 
Observations 53 53 53 53 
Log Lik 80.26 75.19 66.91 81.53 
arthrho -1.818*** 1.668*** -1.903*** -1.497*** 
Prob>Chi2 (joint test of exclusion 
Restri) 0.05 0.06 0.1202 0.0079 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: Effect of ethnic diversity on the efficiency of public spending on Infrastructure 
  Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization Ethnolinguistic Polarization 
Dependent Variable Efficiency score-DEA Efficiency score-DEA Efficiency score-DEA Efficiency score-DEA 
ELF1/POL1 -0.261* 
 
0.000699 
 
 
(0.147) 
 
(0.000462) 
 ELF15/POL15 
 
-0.107 
 
0.000952*** 
  
(0.121) 
 
(0.000326) 
Log(Urban Population % total) -0.0599 0.0161 -0.000338 -0.000558** 
 
(0.0986) (0.0927) (0.000291) (0.000238) 
Log(GDP Per capita) 0.167** 0.133* 0.000413* 0.000433** 
 
(0.0746) (0.0719) (0.000219) (0.000184) 
Tax revenue in % of GDP -0.00679 -0.00503 -3.15e-07 5.82e-06 
 
(0.00458) (0.00465) (1.35e-05) (1.19e-05) 
Log(total % educated people) -0.0176 -0.000318 6.55e-05 8.36e-05 
 
(0.0823) (0.0824) (0.000240) (0.000211) 
Initial Inequality-Gini index -0.139 -0.162 -0.00186** -0.00176*** 
 
(0.257) (0.259) (0.000749) (0.000663) 
Latitude -0.00106 -0.000366 -8.07e-07 1.04e-06 
 
(0.00260) (0.00264) (7.59e-06) (6.70e-06) 
Longitude 0.00115 0.000836 -6.68e-06 -5.57e-06 
 
(0.00227) (0.00228) (6.61e-06) (5.81e-06) 
Initial level of corruption-ICRG -0.0131 -0.0206 -0.000103 -6.37e-05 
 
(0.0311) (0.0313) (9.07e-05) (8.02e-05) 
Governance effectivenness 0.0957 0.0988 0.000451** 0.000432** 
 
(0.0672) (0.0678) (0.000196) (0.000173) 
Democracy index-Polity4 0.00159 0.00139 -2.13e-05 -2.47e-05 
 
(0.00710) (0.00722) (2.07e-05) (1.84e-05) 
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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     First step-exclusion restrictions 
    
Terrain ruggedness index, 100m -0.148*** -0.212*** -0.187*** -0.0840** 
 
(0.0461) (0.0380) (0.0398) (0.0384) 
Distance from slave market-Atlantic -0.234*** -0.110*** -0.193*** 0.00654 
 
(0.0536) (0.0340) (0.0527) (0.0424) 
Distance from slave market-indian -0.167*** -0.174*** -0.165*** -0.0424 
 
(0.0529) (0.0352) (0.0454) (0.0423) 
Distance from slave market-Saharian -0.300 1.282*** -0.284 0.650** 
 
(0.257) (0.231) (0.194) (0.253) 
Constant -0.769 -0.750 0.766*** 0.780*** 
 
(0.568) (0.577) (0.00166) (0.00147) 
Observations 46 46 46 46 
Log Lik 52.48 56.68 326.4 330.3 
arthrho 0.427 -0.375 -1.879*** -1.759*** 
Prob>Chi2 (joint test of exclusion 
Restri) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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5. Conclusion 
This paper has uncovered new evidences on the relationship between ethnic diversity and the 
provision of public goods in developing countries. While the existing literature focuses on 
output of public goods such as infant mortality, infrastructure quality and school attainment, 
we put a strong emphasis on the efficiency of the related spending. Specifically, we 
investigate the effect of ethnic diversity on the ability of a government to reach a desirable 
output at the lowest cost.  
For this purpose, input efficiency is scored in a sample of 77 countries using data from 1996 
to 2012. Further, we investigate the effect of ethnic diversity on cross country variation in 
efficiency. Two main findings are drawn from this study. First, barely 12% of the sample of 
countries under study makes an efficient use of public expenditure. That means there still a 
room for governments to achieve social improvements at low cost. Second, results show that 
the effect of ethnic diversity on the efficiency depends mainly on the measure used, the level 
of aggregation and the nature of the expenditure. Specifically, no matters the level of 
aggregation, ethnic polarization is positively associated with higher efficiency. In contrast, 
ethnic fractionalization does have a negative or at the best no effect on efficiency, especially 
at the finest level of disaggregation.  
Those findings add to the existing literature by highlighting the fact that even in ethnic diverse 
countries, while diversity in preferences and lack of coordination may reduce the provision of 
public goods, there is still a room of improvement in the management of public spending.  
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APPENDIX 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics, Health regression 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Efficiency score-Health 55 0.6720562 0.1697741 0.2347496 1 
POL1 68 0.3470456 0.3409837 0 0.9976 
POL15 68 0.4096191 0.2487586 0.0003 0.883 
ELF1 68 0.1950059 0.2005245 0 0.6466 
ELF15 68 0.522975 0.3398057 0.0002 0.9903 
Urban Population % total 55 43.81313 20.02984 7.9355 90.8792 
GDP Per capita 53 5167.464 4149.605 574.2497 16656.92 
Tax revenue in % of GDP 55 14.65053 6.693941 4.91703 46.88235 
total % educated people 66 5.5845285 1.5940545 1.140641 10.637878 
Initial Inequality-Gini index 66 0.4408219 0.1068498 .2255584 0.6734387 
Latitude 68 7.065822 18.3302 -35.3959 41.46448 
Longitude 68 11.32396 68.07488 -102.5356 161.9878 
Initial level of corruption-ICRG 65 2.941001 0.7892103 0 5 
Terrain ruggedness index, 100m 68 1.367767 1.268877 0.1149095 6.202062 
Distance from slave market-Atlantic 30 7.14416 3.090935 3.705474 16.39266 
Distance from slave market-indian 30 6.731026 4.164672 0.0319096 15.83294 
Distance from slave market-Saharian 30 3.697163 1.720329 0.3097339 6.637325 
Note:  This is the minimum number of observations used in regressions 
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Table A2: Descriptive statistics, Education regression 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Efficiency score-Education 77 0.2865227 0.2280796 0.0801498 1 
POL1 89 0.320236 0.3377312 0 0.9976 
POL15 89 0.440991 0.244056 0.0014 0.9141 
ELF1 89 0.176373 0.1923945 0 0.6466 
ELF15 89 0.5145404 0.3199767 0.0007 0.9718 
Urban Population % total 74 3.743807 0.5070626 2.071346 4.509531 
GDP Per capita 72 8.341128 0.8680146 6.530031 9.720581 
Tax revenue in % of GDP 74 15.10706 6.964017 7.33897 46.88235 
total % educated people 83 1.816542 0.4687386 0.1315904 2.478202 
Initial Inequality-Gini index 96 0.4110049 0.1125333 0.2174829 .6734387 
Latitude 89 11.52661 21.01122 -35.3959 53.54239 
Longitude 89 14.82286 65.8656 -174.8472 167.7031 
Initial level of corruption-ICRG 100 3.120847 0.7912727 1 6 
Governance Effectivenness 74 -0.4145048 0.5323268 -1.736698 0.8966388 
Democracy index-Polity4 80 3.219167 5.586597 -9.2 10 
Terrain ruggedness index, 100m 89 1.366529 1.344923 0.0028978 6.740056 
Distance from slave market-Atlantic 36 7.099007 3.038361 3.705474 16.39266 
Distance from slave market-indian 36 6.993432 4.18446 0.0319096 15.83294 
Distance from slave market-Saharian 36 3.597452 1.691004 0.3097339 6.637325 
Note:  This is the minimum number of observations used in regressions 
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Table A3: Descriptive statistics, Infrastructure regression 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Efficiency score-Education 64 0.4099851 0.2359504 0.0834613 1 
POL1 64 0.3741594 0.3641579 0 0.9974 
POL15 64 0.4787062 0.2149218 0.0086 0.8269 
ELF1 64 0.2093531 0.210498 0 0.6466 
ELF15 64 0.5570359 0.2980435 0.0043 0.9475 
Urban Population % total 64 30.769654 0.4807815 20.557499 40.499608 
GDP Per capita 63 80.387351 0.8575391 60.353065 90.720581 
Tax revenue in % of GDP 64 150.23202 70.472802 20.859736 460.88235 
total % educated people 52 10.821814 0.4306263 0.3749122 20.379931 
Initial Inequality-Gini index 63 0.4120539 0.1172901 0.2174829 0.6734387 
Latitude 64 140.68523 200.22016 -290.58041 530.54239 
Longitude 64 130.74973 610.65404 -1020.5356 1220.8681 
Initial level of corruption-ICRG 64 30.013951 0.7923696 0 5 
Governance Effectivenness 64 -0.4097157 0.525245 -10.789034 0.8966388 
Democracy index-Polity4 53 20.836478 50.335217 -90.2 10 
Terrain ruggedness index, 100m 64 10.317582 10.374201 0.0028978 60.740056 
Distance from slave market-Atlantic 24 70.004835 30.122478 30.888797 160.39266 
Distance from slave market-indian 24 70.576112 40.13097 0.9039161 150.83294 
Distance from slave market-Saharian 24 30.291081 10.784042 0.3097339 60.637325 
Note:  This is the minimum number of observations used in regressions 
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Table A4: Efficiency scores 
Health Education Infrastructure 
Country Efficiency Score-DEA Rank Country Efficiency Score Rank Country Efficiency Score Rank 
Sierra Leone 1.000000 1 Kazakhstan 1.000000 1 Jordan 1.000000 1 
Malaysia 1.000000 2 Turkey 1.000000 2 Mexico 1.000000 2 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.911439 3 Armenia 0.791537 3 South Africa 1.000000 3 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.905394 4 Bulgaria 0.701215 4 Turkey 1.000000 4 
Cameroon 0.897054 5 Tajikistan 0.687857 5 Ukraine 1.000000 5 
Pakistan 0.867765 6 Albania 0.679526 6 Bulgaria 0.931897 6 
Venezuela, RB 0.866016 7 Ukraine 0.642240 7 Dominica 0.745970 7 
Mali 0.859056 8 Tonga 0.625606 8 Kyrgyz Republic 0.700880 8 
Mexico 0.822700 9 Peru 0.617000 9 Venezuela, RB 0.665630 9 
Niger 0.813407 10 Argentina 0.584485 10 El Salvador 0.658535 10 
Jamaica 0.813384 11 Ecuador 0.575166 11 Georgia 0.639625 11 
Afghanistan 0.804843 12 Kyrgyz Republic 0.569087 12 Kazakhstan 0.637978 12 
Lao PDR 0.783932 13 Belize 0.562560 13 Brazil 0.582942 13 
Benin 0.777861 14 Dominican Republic 0.553007 14 Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.547547 14 
Morocco 0.771401 15 Panama 0.532288 15 Angola 0.531399 15 
Burundi 0.769458 16 Jamaica 0.508820 16 Sri Lanka 0.519010 16 
Uganda 0.760060 17 Fiji 0.491725 17 Belarus 0.498934 17 
India 0.758371 18 Gabon 0.446757 18 Moldova 0.486664 18 
Togo 0.754658 19 Malaysia 0.403040 19 Tunisia 0.482782 19 
Zambia 0.751977 20 Philippines 0.390445 20 Pakistan 0.403717 20 
Rwanda 0.750284 21 Jordan 0.388449 21 Algeria 0.402518 21 
Indonesia 0.745708 22 Mongolia 0.388331 22 Azerbaijan 0.401180 22 
Cambodia 0.730717 23 Mexico 0.362936 23 Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.392598 23 
Tajikistan 0.730357 24 Mauritius 0.362193 24 Panama 0.369153 24 
Kenya 0.718160 25 Bolivia 0.346514 25 Belize 0.366885 25 
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Bangladesh 0.701240 26 South Africa 0.341522 26 Malaysia 0.365404 26 
Lesotho 0.698243 27 Guyana 0.327878 27 Indonesia 0.365245 27 
Gambia, The 0.694882 28 China 0.304686 28 Nigeria 0.353786 28 
Guatemala 0.682271 29 Costa Rica 0.303404 29 Nepal 0.346870 29 
Ghana 0.669066 30 Colombia 0.294465 30 Jamaica 0.344006 30 
Nepal 0.666118 31 Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.288387 31 Guatemala 0.337978 31 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.647399 32 Venezuela, RB 0.282268 32 Cote d'Ivoire 0.334291 32 
Philippines 0.644756 33 El Salvador 0.254297 33 India 0.331533 33 
Papua New Guinea 0.638568 34 Cuba 0.242996 34 Morocco 0.316106 34 
Bolivia 0.611965 35 Paraguay 0.214005 35 Bolivia 0.306284 35 
Armenia 0.610936 36 Botswana 0.160274 36 Paraguay 0.299555 36 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.609777 37 Thailand 0.159740 37 Namibia 0.277382 37 
Kyrgyz Republic 0.590986 38 Ghana 0.152262 38 Costa Rica 0.274218 38 
Belize 0.590720 39 Guatemala 0.150908 39 Zambia 0.266102 39 
Thailand 0.590170 40 Congo, Rep. 0.141050 40 Togo 0.262638 40 
Botswana 0.581507 41 Indonesia 0.136563 41 Congo, Rep. 0.262218 41 
Peru 0.570269 42 Nicaragua 0.134696 42 Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.258346 42 
Paraguay 0.563815 43 Cameroon 0.126303 43 Kenya 0.257561 43 
Sri Lanka 0.546591 44 Pakistan 0.125468 44 Philippines 0.254162 44 
South Africa 0.541023 45 Gambia, The 0.125210 45 Benin 0.253360 45 
Fiji 0.538913 46 Cambodia 0.124835 46 Cambodia 0.251781 46 
Tunisia 0.532557 47 Mauritania 0.124442 47 Burkina Faso 0.251684 47 
Nicaragua 0.532224 48 Central African Republic 0.123649 48 Uganda 0.250821 48 
Honduras 0.508799 49 Lao PDR 0.122467 49 Peru 0.249796 49 
Namibia 0.474395 50 India 0.121561 50 Niger 0.247730 50 
El Salvador 0.447922 51 Bangladesh 0.121527 51 Gambia, The 0.244697 51 
Colombia 0.326367 52 Benin 0.119786 52 Ethiopia 0.241303 52 
Panama 0.290040 53 Senegal 0.119039 53 Madagascar 0.240376 53 
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Argentina 0.262823 54 Cote d'Ivoire 0.118740 54 Bangladesh 0.240373 54 
Costa Rica 0.234750 55 Sierra Leone 0.118159 55 Mali 0.239245 55 
  
  Niger 0.118127 56 Nicaragua 0.227528 56 
  
  Mali 0.118107 57 Ghana 0.226981 57 
  
  Nepal 0.118096 58 Bhutan 0.224213 58 
  
  Togo 0.117386 59 Lesotho 0.222109 59 
  
  Uganda 0.117298 60 Lao PDR 0.221010 60 
  
  Burundi 0.116491 61 Suriname 0.196682 61 
  
  Tanzania 0.116326 62 China 0.187838 62 
  
  Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.115964 63 Mongolia 0.158533 63 
  
  Liberia 0.115804 64 Grenada 0.083461 64 
  
  Mozambique 0.115783 65 
   
  
  Rwanda 0.115625 66 
   
  
  Malawi 0.114975 67 
   
  
  Kenya 0.110194 68 
   
  
  Algeria 0.109938 69 
   
  
  Vietnam 0.107523 70 
   
  
  Morocco 0.104412 71 
   
  
  Yemen, Rep. 0.098851 72 
   
  
  Swaziland 0.092602 73 
   
  
  Maldives 0.091778 74 
   
  
  Tunisia 0.090728 75 
   
  
  Lesotho 0.084718 76 
   
      Namibia 0.080150 77       
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Table A5: Efficiency scores, less efficient versus most efficiency 
  Health Education  Infrastructure 
 
Most efficient Less efficient Most efficient Less efficient Most efficient Less efficient 
 
Sierra Leone Argentina Kazakhstan Lesotho Jordan Mongolia 
Countries Malaysia Costa Rica Turkey Namibia Mexico Grenada 
     
South Africa 
 
     
Turkey 
           Ukraine   
Mean of ELF1 0 .3421 0.0847 0 .37825  0.23905 0.16304 0.02145 
Mean of ELF15  0.78775 0.13125  0.4946 0.53425   0.45384  0.19785 
Mean of POL1 0.59725 0.16125  0.7182 0.3789 0.31014 0.04285 
Mean of POL15  0.5568  0 .234  0.61165 0 .5096  0.526 0 .33 
 
 
